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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Petitioners are three groups of plaintiffs seeking damages 
for personal injury and wrongful death as a result of 
exposure to asbestos. Respondents are some of the 
defendants in some of the cases brought by the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs' claims were initially filed in the Northern 
District of New York (the "New York plaintiffs"), the 
Northern District of Georgia (the "Georgia plaintiffs") and 
the District of Oregon (the "Oregon plaintiffs"). Pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.  1407(a), the plaintiffs' claims were transferred 
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to 
Multidistrict Litigation No. 875 ("MDL No. 875"), which is 
pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (the "transferee court"). 
 
At various times during the past seven years, some of the 
Oregon plaintiffs have filed motions for suggestion of 
remand with the transferee court. The last such motion was 
filed in May 1997. Receiving no response, in May 1998 
counsel for the Oregon plaintiffs appeared before the JPML 
to seek remand. On May 20, 1998, the JPML denied the 
Oregon plaintiffs' motion to remand. 
 
Some, but not all, of the New York plaintiffs filed motions 
for a suggestion of remand with the transferee court in 
March 1998. By October 1998, the transferee court still 
had not acted on the motions, and ten of the New York 
plaintiffs filed a motion for remand with the JPML. In 
December, the New York plaintiffs filed a motion to clarify 
explaining that the prior motion to remand sought remand 
of all claims of all the New York plaintiffs, and not just the 
ten who had originally filed. 
 
Some, but not all, of the Georgia plaintiffs filed motions 
for a suggestion of remand with the transferee court in 
April and May of 1998. In September 1998, the transferee 
court still had not acted on the motions for suggestion of 
remand, and all of the Georgia plaintiffs filed a motion for 
remand with the JPML. On February 5, 1999, the JPML 
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denied the New York and Georgia plaintiffs' motions for 
remand. 
 
On June 29, 1999, all of the plaintiffs filed a petition for 
writ of mandamus asking this Court to order the JPML to 
remand their cases. We will deny the petition. 
 
The parties have submitted affidavits that establish the 
following undisputed facts. The New York and Georgia 
plaintiffs' injuries range from the invariably fatal cancer 
mesothelioma, for which asbestos exposure is the only 
known cause, to pleural disease, a non-malignant scarring 
of the lining of the lung. Many have died from asbestos- 
related injuries, a good number of them during the 
pendency of MDL 875. The Oregon plaintiffs' injuries 
include malignancies and non-malignancies. 
 
Following the creation of MDL 875, plaintiffs' and 
defendants' steering committees were organized that 
attempted to negotiate a global settlement of all asbestos 
claims. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
599-600 (1997). These negotiations, however, eventually 
"fell apart." Id. at 600. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee 
(PSC) has not met since 1993, and has been completely 
inactive.1 Subsequently, twenty defendants and certain 
former members of the PSC proposed the settlement class 
action that was at issue in Amchem. See id. at 600-01. The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected the class certification 
"[g]iven the greater number of questions peculiar to the 
several categories of class members, and to individuals 
within each category, and the significance of those 
uncommon questions." Id. at 624. 
 
The affidavits assert that during the seven year pendency 
of MDL 875, "no common or global discovery has been 
sought or conducted by either Plaintiffs or Defendants in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Defendant Owen-Illinois asserts that numerous members of 
the PSC met with defendants' representatives in 1999 and discussed the 
content of the master case management orders that various transferor 
courts should enter into were MDL 875 to disband, that meeting was 
never endorsed, organized or convened as a PSC gathering, nor was 
correspondence regarding the meeting issued to the full membership of 
the PSC, nor was it understood in advance that MDL 875 was even on 
the agenda for the meeting. 
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this action, and no common questions of law or fact have 
been the subject of global resolution by [the transferee] 
Court." (A. 16-17). Since 1991, all discovery, settlement or 
other litigation activity in MDL 875 has related either to the 
Amchem class action or to individual claims or groups of 
claims. In the past two years, the transferee court has 
overseen broad discovery regarding litigation screening 
companies, the physicians they employ, and the nature of 
their contracts with plaintiffs' firms. 
 
Since the creation of MDL 875, the New York and Georgia 
plaintiffs have supplemented their answers to discovery on 
several occasions including as recently as April 1998, when 
they provided "updated information regarding their work 
history and exposures to Defendants' asbestos-containing 
products, and any new information regarding their medical 
status."2 (A. 61). Their claims have also "been the subject of 
numerous settlement conferences conducted by the 
transferee court." (A. 61). Counsel for the New York and 
Georgia plaintiffs have submitted sworn affidavits stating 
that "with the exception of settlements of some plaintiffs' 
cases with some defendants, the settlement discussions 
have not resolved the cases." (A. 61). They further state that 
"in many instances, Defendants have failed to generate any 
monetary offer to settle Plaintiffs' cases; and in remaining 
cases, the Defendants have failed to offer settlement 
amounts that approach historical settlement values for 
similar claims." (A. 61). 
 
Summaries of the New York docket sheets, however, 
reflect that individual plaintiffs have settled with anywhere 
from one to eleven defendants for amounts ranging from 
$3,500 to $739,136. The plaintiffs respond with an affidavit 
explaining that these settlement figures are inaccurate, in 
that they reflect gross amounts of settlement with the 
Johns Manville bankruptcy trust, even though plaintiffs will 
receive only ten per cent of that money, and in that they 
occasionally reflect double counting of settlements. The 
plaintiffs do not provide settlement information of their 
own, however, and, even accounting for these inaccuracies, 
the number and amount of settlements have in many cases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Their original answers were filed prior to the inception of MDL 875. 
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been substantial. Moreover, other additional settlements 
may well have been signed, as the docket summaries show 
significant delays (in some cases, five years) between 
settlements being signed and their being entered on the 
docket. See also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13850, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996) (of the 
22,000 open cases on the docket in 1996, thousands were 
resolved but not yet dismissed and statistically removed). 
The New York docket summaries show that in each of the 
New York plaintiffs' cases, anywhere from two to eighteen 
defendants remain, with the average number being 
approximately eleven. 
 
Neither party has provided information regarding the 
settlement status of the Georgia or Oregon plaintiffs' 
individual claims. The plaintiffs do indicate that the Georgia 
docket sheets show between one and five defendants 
remaining on each individual claim. Also, counsel for the 
Oregon plaintiffs indicates that prior to the establishment 
of MDL 875 the average length of time for resolution of an 
Oregon case was less than one year, whereas in MDL 875 
the average exceeds five years. Although settlement 
conferences were held regarding the Oregon cases in 1995, 
1996 and either 1998 or 1999, plaintiffs' efforts at 
settlement have been "to little avail." (A. 115-16). 
 
The transferee court has stated, although not in the 
context of the plaintiffs' particular claims, that among its 
"overriding objectives" "[t]hroughout the course of the 
multidistrict litigation" is the court's "considered judicial 
opinion that the sick and dying, their widows and survivors 
should have their claims addressed first." Carlough v. 
Amchem, No. 93-215, at 8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1993) (Mem. 
Op.). The court explained that it "steadfastly resisted 
motions to remand cases back to transferor courts unless 
the claimant was seriously ill or dying and all avenues of 
settlement were exhausted."3Id. The court has also 
"advised counsel that motions to remand involving other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court also has a practice when it does remand cases of severing 
and retaining jurisdiction over punitive damages claims. (A. 59). 
However, this has not happened in any of the plaintiffs' cases, and thus 
is not an issue for consideration on this appeal. 
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circumstances would only serve to deplete resources 
otherwise available for settlements and thus would be 
routinely denied." Id. 
 
The transferee court's Administrative Order No. 3, which 
relates to all asbestos actions, reflects this policy. This 
Order establishes that in attempting to resolve cases 
through negotiation, cases of mesothelioma and lung 
cancer with asbestosis will be "address[ed] . . . on a priority 
basis." (A. 47-48). However, the court cautioned that 
"special efforts to resolve hardship cases are not a 
substitute for broad-based negotiations designed to reduce 
docket the [sic] backlog." (A. 47). The Order establishes the 
procedures for exchange of information and negotiation to 
be followed in MDL 875. If this process does not produce a 
resolution, "the Court shall determine whether the matter is 
appropriate for immediate remand of the plaintiff 's 
compensatory damages claims." (A. 50). The Order states 
that only when all priority cases have been addressed will 
the court consider applying similar procedures to address 
cases of other malignant conditions and asbestosis and 
that "[a]s to cases that involve non-malignant conditions 
other than asbestosis, the Court intends to establish an 
inactive docket." (A. 53). 
 
This process has resulted in numerous cases being 
resolved. As of late 1996, some 62,000 cases had been 
assigned to MDL 875 and approximately 40,000 had been 
resolved. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13850, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996) 
(Mem. Op.). The remaining 22,000 cases included 
thousands of cases that had been resolved but not yet 
dismissed. See id. As of January 1999, nearly 60,000 cases 
had been closed. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
VI), No. 875, at 2 (JPML Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished order 
denying remand). Thus, in 1997 and 1998, the transferee 
court closed nearly 10,000 cases a year. 
 
This process has also resulted in approximately 1,000 
actions or claims being remanded to the transferor courts. 
See id. 
 
Plaintiffs' claims are all diversity actions brought in 
federal district court under 28 U.S.C.  1332. These claims 
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were transferred by the JPML to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.  1407. The JPML had jurisdiction to consider 
plaintiffs' motions to remand their actions to the transferor 
courts under 28 U.S.C.  1407(a). This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the JPML's denial of remand pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  1407(e). Section 1407(e) provides that JPML 
orders may be reviewed only by extraordinary writ pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  1651. 
 
I. 
 
"Traditionally, the writ of mandamus has been used `to 
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its 
authority when it is its duty to do so.' " E.g., In re Chambers 
Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Will v. 
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 665, 661 (1978)). "The writ is 
a drastic remedy that `is seldom issued and its use is 
discouraged.' " Id. (quoting Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 
1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988)). The writ of mandamus should 
only be granted "in response to an act amounting to a 
judicial usurption of power." Id. (quoting Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 462 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
Two prerequisites for issuance of a writ are: "(1) that 
petitioner have no other adequate means to attain the 
desired relief, and (2) that petitioner meets its burden of 
showing that its right to the writ is clear and indisputable." 
Id. (quoting Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 74 F.3d at 462). The 
petitioners have the burden of proving these two 
prerequisites. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court , 490 U.S. 296, 
309 (1989). As to the first prong, where there are practical 
avenues for seeking relief that are untried, this Court will 
ordinarily deny a petition for mandamus. See Hahnemann 
Univ. Hosp., 74 F.3d at 461 ("[W]here interlocutory appeal 
seems a practical but untried avenue, we will ordinarily 
deny a petition for mandamus."). However, formal 
exhaustion of futile remedies is not required. See id. at 462 
(granting mandamus despite petitioner's failure to make a 
formal application for certification of an interlocutory 
appeal where an informal application had been made and 
not granted). As to the second prong, where a court 
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commits a clear error of law, a right to relief is clear and 
indisputable. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. 
Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, mandamus 
can apply to discretionary acts where petitioners can 
demonstrate a "clear abuse of discretion." Mallard, 490 U.S. 
at 309. 
 
"Even when these requirements are met, issuance of the 
writ is largely discretionary . . . ." In re Chambers Dev. Co., 
148 F.3d at 223. "[I]t is within a court's discretion to refrain 
from issuing the writ even when the requirements for 
mandamus are technically satisfied. The availability of the 
writ `does not compel its exercise.' " Id. (quoting Lusardi, 
855 F.2d at 1070). 
 
In the instant case, ordinary appeal is not available; 
section 1407(e) provides that "[n]o proceedings for review of 
the panel may be permitted except by extraordinary writ." 
28 U.S.C.  1407(e). Nonetheless, some of the plaintiffs have 
other practical means to obtain the relief sought. Those 
plaintiffs who did not seek a suggestion of remand from the 
transferee court before filing their motion to remand with 
the JPML have a practical but untried avenue for relief 
available to them. While it is true that plaintiffs are not 
required to seek a suggestion of remand prior tofiling a 
motion to remand with the JPML, see JPML Rule 7.6(c), the 
JPML Rules state that "[t]he Panel is reluctant to order 
remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee 
district court." JPML Rule 7.6(d). In view of this reluctance 
and the "great weight" that the Panel has consistently given 
to the transferee judge's determination that remand is 
appropriate, In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 458 F. 
Supp. 220, 222 (JPML 1978), it is possible that were the 
plaintiffs to obtain a suggestion of remand from the 
transferee court, the JPML would grant their motions for 
remand. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that there was no point in seeking a 
suggestion of remand from the transferee court, given that 
it had not issued such a suggestion for other plaintiffs 
grouped in their respective cause numbers who did seek 
such suggestions. They argue that the grounds for seeking 
remand were identical for all petitioners. However, a 
determination that coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
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proceedings have concluded and that remand is therefore 
appropriate is necessarily case-specific. Within each group, 
plaintiffs have had differing rates of success in settling 
claims and plaintiffs have experienced different injuries and 
therefore are impacted differently by the priority policy 
reflected in Administrative Order No. 3. Merely because 
some plaintiffs have had their requests for suggestions of 
remand go unanswered does not mean that it is futile for 
other plaintiffs to make such requests. Indeed, the 
transferee court has suggested remand in close to 1000 
cases. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 875 
(JPML Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished order denying remand). 
 
Thus, only those plaintiffs who actually sought 
suggestion of remand from the transferee court have 
satisfied the first prong of the mandamus inquiry. 
 
II. 
 
The remaining plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear 
and indisputable right to remand. Section 1407(a) provides 
that: 
 
        When civil actions involving one or more common 
       questions of fact are pending in different districts, such 
       actions may be transferred to any district for 
       coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such 
       transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on 
       multidistrict litigation . . . upon its determination that 
       transfers for such proceedings will be for the 
       convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote 
       the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each 
       action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at 
       or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to 
       the district from which it was transferred unless it 
       shall have been previously terminated: Provided, 
       however, that the panel may separate any claim, cross- 
       claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand 
       any of such claims before the remainder of the action 
       is remanded. 
 
28 U.S.C.  1407(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute 
imposes two limitations on the kinds of proceedings that 
the transferee court may conduct: they must be (1) 
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coordinated or consolidated and (2) pretrial. See Lexecon 
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
33-34 (1998). Moreover, the statute "obligates the Panel to 
remand any pending case to its originating court when, at 
the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their 
course," which obligation is "impervious to judicial 
discretion." Id. at 34-35. The plaintiffs acknowledge that 
individual settlement negotiations and discovery continue 
in MDL 875 and the docket sheets show a pattern of 
settlements continuing through 1999.4 They argue, 
however, that individual settlement negotiations and 
discovery do not constitute "coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings," that all "coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings" have concluded, and that they 
therefore have a clear and indisputable right to relief. 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon indicates that 
the phrase "coordinated or consolidated" is to be 
interpreted broadly. See id. at 33-34. Lexecon was a suit for 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious 
interference, commercial disparagement and defamation 
arising out of the defendant law firm's conduct as counsel 
in a prior class action brought against the plaintiff Lexecon 
and others for violations of securities laws. See id. at 28-29. 
The class action against Lexecon had been transferred for 
coordinated and consolidated pretrial proceedings under 
 1407(a) along with other cases arising out of the failure of 
Lincoln Savings and Loan. See id. at 29. During the pretrial 
proceedings, the class action plaintiffs and Lexecon reached 
a "resolution" under which the claims against Lexecon were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the petitioners downplay the success of these settlement 
negotiations and state that results would have been much quicker in 
their transferee districts, the standard for remand is that coordinated 
pretrial proceedings be concluded, not that they provide the quickest 
resolution of particular cases. 
 
The petitioners' second supplemental affidavit suggests that settlement 
negotiations in fact are not ongoing in that the remaining defendants 
have stated conclusively that they will not settle until the cases are set 
for trial. This affidavit, however, was not presented to either the 
transferee court or the JPML. Therefore, insofar as the petitioner's 
claims 
are based on this evidence, they have a practical and untried avenue for 
seeking relief and mandamus will not issue. 
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dismissed. See id. Lexecon then filed its malicious 
prosecution case, which was transferred by the JPML to the 
transferee court under  1407(a), albeit to a different judge. 
See id. at 29-30. In transferring, the Panel noted that 
Lexecon's claims 
 
       share questions of fact with an as yet unapproved 
       settlement involving Touche Ross, Lexecon, Inc. and 
       the investor plaintiffs in the Lincoln Savings investor 
       class actions in MDL-834 . . . [,] that . . . a massive 
       document depository is located in the [transferee 
       district] and . . . the Ninth Circuit has before it an 
       appeal of an order . . . in MDL-834 which may be 
       relevant to the Lexecon claims. 
 
Id. at 30. Subsequently, however, the Ninth Circuit appeal 
was dismissed, the document depository was closed down, 
and the remaining parties to the Lincoln Savings litigation 
reached a final settlement on which final judgment was 
entered. See id. Lexecon then moved for suggestion of 
remand, which the law firm opposed because discovery was 
still incomplete. See id. The law firmfiled a countermotion 
requesting that the transferee court "transfer" the case to 
itself for trial under  1404(a). See id.  The transferee court 
deferred ruling on these motions for three months, until 
after summary judgment and Rule 54(b) final judgment had 
been entered on all but the defamation claim. See id. at 30- 
31. At that point, the transferee court granted the law 
firm's motion to assign the case to itself for trial and denied 
Lexecon's motion for suggestion of remand. See id. at 31. 
 
The Court framed the issue as "whether  1407(a) does 
permit a transferee court to entertain a  1404(a) transfer 
motion to keep the case for trial." Id. at 32. The Court 
stated that "[a]lthough [ 1407(a)] limits a transferee court's 
authority to the conduct of `coordinated or consolidated' 
proceedings and to those that are `pretrial,' these limitations 
alone raise no obvious bar to a transferee's retention of a 
case under  1404." Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added). The 
Court explained that "[i]f `consolidated' proceedings alone 
were authorized, there would be an argument that self- 
assignment of one or some cases out of many was not 
contemplated, but because the proceedings need only be 
coordinated, no such narrow limitation is apparent. " Id. at 
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34 (emphasis added). Thus, a proceeding that relates only 
to a single individual's case or claim can nonetheless be 
coordinated. The Court elaborated, "While it is certainly 
true that the instant case was not consolidated with any 
other for the purpose literally of litigating identical issues 
on common evidence, it is fair to say that proceedings to 
resolve pretrial matters were `coordinated' with the conduct 
of earlier cases sharing a common core . . . , if only by 
being brought before judges in a district where much of the 
evidence was to be found and overlapping issues had been 
considered." Id. (emphasis added). Even the fact that the 
case was being heard by a different judge, although it 
limited the prospects for coordination, did not eliminate 
them. See id. Neither, apparently, did the fact that all of the 
proceedings with which the individual action was 
"coordinated" had already concluded raise a bar. This is 
evident not only from the facts of the case, where all of the 
other cases had been reduced to final judgment when the 
case-specific motion was being considered, but also from 
the Court's use of the past tense in stating that it was 
enough that the case was "being brought before judges in 
a district where much of the evidence was to be found [even 
though the evidence depository had been closed] and 
overlapping issues had been considered." Id. (emphasis 
added). Moreover, the case suggests that it is not necessary 
that any one issue be common to all cases, so long as 
issues "overlap." Id. 
 
This passage cannot be reconciled with the plaintiffs' 
argument that "coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings" are concluded when the transferee court 
ceases to conduct proceedings that are common to all. To 
be coordinated, it is not necessary that common issues are 
being contemporaneously addressed. In the instant case, it 
seems probable that "much of the evidence," at least 
regarding causation, is to be found in the transferee 
district. Id. Furthermore, overlapping issues "ha[ve] been 
considered": the transferee court oversaw the initial 
attempts at global settlement and set forth procedures 
applicable to all regarding the mandatory exchange of 
information, the negotiation process, and the prioritizing of 
cases. Moreover, the transferee court continues to conduct 
discovery regarding the use of litigation screenings that 
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overlaps many of the cases in MDL-875. Although there is 
no allegation that litigation screenings were conducted in 
any of the plaintiffs' individual cases, this issue is common 
to many cases from many different transferor districts. 
Thus, applying the reasoning of Lexecon, it appears that the 
individual settlement negotiations and conferences that are 
occurring in plaintiffs' cases are in fact "coordinated" 
proceedings. 
 
Furthermore, such proceedings are "pretrial.""[P]retrial, 
as an adjective, means before trial-- . . . all judicial 
proceedings before trial are pretrial proceedings." In re 
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 494 (JPML 
1968); Wright el al., Federal Practice and Procedure  3866 
("Interpreted literally, the transferee court appears to have 
control over all proceeding prior to trial[,]" including 
discovery motions, motions to amend, to dismiss, for 
summary judgment, and to determine class certification.). 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to 
pretrial conferences, states that the court may require 
conferences before trial for the purpose of "facilitating the 
settlement of the case." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(a)(5). 
Therefore, there is no basis for concluding that settlement 
conferences are not pretrial proceedings. 
 
The legislative history of  1407 also demonstrates that 
Congress intended transferee courts to have broad pretrial 
authority. 
 
        By the term "pretrial proceedings" the committee has 
       reference to the practice and procedure which precede 
       trial of an action. These generally involve deposition 
       and discovery, and, of course, are governed by the 
       Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Federal 
       rules the transferee district court would have authority 
       to render summary judgment, to control and limit 
       pretrial proceedings, and to impose sanctions for 
       failure to make discovery or comply with pretrial 
       orders. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1898, 1900; see also Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Committee of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 
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13 (1966) (testimony of Dean Neal) ("[T]he cases concerned 
would be brought within the control of a single district and 
so the very same powers provided by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure should permit all of the same kinds of steps 
to be carried out by the presiding district judge."). Although 
the legislative history does not specifically mention 
settlement, it does indicate that the Federal Rules provide 
the measure of a transferee court's pretrial authority, and 
the Federal Rules allow for conferences to facilitate 
settlement. 
 
The plaintiffs point to legislative history stating: 
 
        The objective of the legislation is to provide 
       centralized management under court supervision of 
       pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure 
       the "just and efficient conduct" of such actions. The 
       committee believes that the possibility for conflict and 
       duplication in discovery and other pretrial procedures 
       in related cases can be avoided or minimized by such 
       centralized management. To accomplish this objective 
       the bill provides for the transfer of venue of an action 
       for the limited purpose of conducting coordinated 
       pretrial proceedings. 
 
H.R. Rep. 1130, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900. Centralized 
management of individual settlement negotiations is not 
inconsistent with the objective of providing "centralized 
management . . . to assure the `just and efficient conduct' 
of . . . actions." Id. Such centralized management avoids 
"the possibility of conflict and duplication" of, if nothing 
else, the judge's time and energy spent becoming familiar 
with the recurring issues of asbestos litigation, the major 
players and how best to facilitate settlement with particular 
defendants. 
 
The plaintiffs also point to legislative history suggesting 
that Congress contemplated that additional discovery might 
be conducted following remand as evidence that such 
individual discovery is not appropriate for the transferee 
court. See Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of 
the Committee of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 56 (1966); H.R. 
Rep. No. 1130, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1901-02. The House 
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Report states that "the committee recognizes that in most 
cases there will be a need for local discovery proceedings to 
supplement coordinated discovery proceedings, and that 
consequently remand . . . for this purpose is desirable." 
H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1901-02. 
Furthermore, during the hearings, the following exchange 
occurred: 
 
        SENATOR TYDINGS: The intent of the coordinating 
       committee, . . . apparently, is that the necessary 
       additional discovery with regard to issues of fact not 
       national or not common to other cases could be 
       conducted once the case was remanded . . . . 
 
        Do you agree that the intent of the bill is to allow 
       additional discovery after remand . . . , and if so, is the 
       language of the legislation sufficiently broad to permit 
       that? 
 
        JUDGE MURRAH: Yes 
 
Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee of 
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 56 (1966). 
 
All of these statements speak in discretionary terms: 
what "in most cases" is "desirable," what the statute 
"allows," and what the transferee court "could" do. Section 
1407 expressly allows for remand "at or before the 
conclusion of . . . pretrial proceedings." 28 U.S.C. 1407(a) 
(emphasis added). Clearly, the Panel has the discretion to 
remand a case when everything that remains to be done is 
case-specific. This does not mean that consolidated 
proceedings have concluded at the point that only case- 
specific proceedings remain; rather, the court can at that 
point exercise its discretion to remand "before the 
conclusion of pretrial proceedings." 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). 
 
For the same reason, the plaintiffs' citation to Panel 
decisions remanding cases prior to the conclusion of all 
pretrial proceedings is unavailing. See In re Air Crash 
Disaster at Tenerife, 461 F. Supp. 671 (JPML 1978); In re 
Evergreen Valley Project Litig., 435 F. Supp. 923 (JPML 
1977). In each of these cases, the Panel exercised its 
discretion to remand, based on its finding that remand "will 
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serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will 
promote the just and efficient conduct of [the litigation]." In 
re Air Crash Disaster, 461 F. Supp. at 672. These remands 
were discretionary. In the instant case, where the 
possibility exists that even individual settlement 
 
negotiations will be more efficient if facilitated by a judge 
who is intimately familiar with the general issues and many 
of the parties, and where in fact the record reflects that 
settlements are successfully being negotiated, one cannot 
say that the Panel abused its discretion in refusing to 
remand. 
 
Lexecon suggests another limitation on the transferee 
court's authority in addition to the requirement that 
proceedings be both coordinated and pretrial. See Lexecon 
523 U.S. at 34-39. After concluding that the requirement of 
"coordinated or consolidated" proceedings did not preclude 
the court from ruling on the transfer motion at issue, the 
court stated that, "at first blush," the requirement of 
pretrial proceedings suggests no reason why the court 
could not rule on such a motion. Id. at 34. Ultimately, 
however, the Court concluded that a  1404 transfer order 
was outside the scope of the transferee court's authority 
because a "necessary consequence of self-assignment by a 
transferee court [is that] it conclusively thwarts the Panel's 
capacity to obey the unconditional command of  1407(a)" 
to remand "at or before the conclusion of pretrial 
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred 
unless [the action] shall have been previously terminated." 
Id. at 36. In the instant case, however, conducting 
individual settlement conferences does not "conclusively 
thwart" the Panel's ability to remand. Unlike a 1404 
transfer, which makes it impossible for the Panel to remand 
even though the action has not been terminated, settlement 
negotiations will either be successful, in which case the 
action will terminate, or they will eventually conclude and 
the action can be remanded at that point. 
 
In conclusion, because individual settlement negotiations 
and conferences are ongoing in the plaintiffs' individual 
cases, and because the transferee court is conducting 
discovery on overlapping issues that affect many asbestos 
cases, even if not the plaintiffs', coordinated pretrial 
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proceedings have not concluded, and the plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the relief 
they seek. Therefore the writ of mandamus will not issue. 
 
III. 
 
At times the plaintiffs appear to be arguing that the JPML 
abdicated its statutory duty when it relied on the fact that 
the transferee court had declined to issue a suggestion of 
remand as one basis for its own decision to deny the 
motion to remand. This policy is embodied in JPML Rule 
7.6(d), which states that "[t]he Panel is reluctant to order 
remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee 
district court." JPML Rule 7.6(c). Deference is not 
abdication, however, and the presence or absence of a 
remand recommendation from the transferee judge as a 
factor in the Panel's decision-making process seems to us 
entirely reasonable. Moreover, if plaintiffs had shown an 
abdication of statutory duty on the part of the Panel, it 
would not satisfy their burden of showing that they have a 
clear and indisputable right to the relief they seek, which is 
remand. To do that, they must clearly and indisputably 
show that coordinated pretrial proceedings have concluded 
in their cases, and that they have not done. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of 
mandamus will be denied. 
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